ODINT
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Master Intelligence Report

Total Data: 26.25 GB, 27,272 files across 55+ government domains PII Extracted: 691+ cédulas, 559+ phones, 93 IMEIs, 659 government emails, 4,296+ citizen names


CRITICAL FINDINGS

1. Exposed Credentials

Credential Source Impact
Oraculo AES key — Password: SNAPsitio30v, Salt: ALRTOPER984TNMGDGFDH minka.gob.ec GitLab Decrypt all inter-site communications for ALL gov WordPress sites
SugarCRM SOAP — User: contactoweb, Pass: _3S(*i6n minka.gob.ec GitLab Access Contacto Ciudadano CRM (citizen PII: cédula, names, addresses)
FirmaEC test API keypruebas minka.gob.ec GitLab Potential access to digital signature test/preprod systems
ARCOTEL meeting passwordwUZNtk8uj53 WordPress post content Published publicly in meeting invite

2. SQL Injection Vectors (Confirmed in Source)

File Parameter Type
ajax_selects.php $_POST['identificador'] Integer injection in WHERE clause
procesarContacto.php $_POST['nombre'] + 13 other fields String injection in INSERT
categoryDownload.php $_REQUEST['categoId'] Integer injection in WHERE clause

Deployed on ALL government sites using Sitio-32 theme (Oraculo platform).

3. SRI Tax Authority — Full API Catalog Exposed

Ecuador's tax authority (18M citizens) exposes its entire Liferay JSONWS API catalog at /api/jsonws without authentication:

  • 48+ service classes, hundreds of methods
  • Document library (50+ methods), Export/Import, User management, Organization management
  • Internal hostname leaked: sriliferay03.sri.ad (from JSESSIONID cookie)
  • Dynatrace APM monitoring active (X-OneAgent-JS-Injection: true)

4. Massive PII Exposure via WordPress REST API

ARCOTEL (Telecom Regulator) — 5,000 comments:

  • 364 cédula (national ID) numbers paired with full names
  • 93 IMEI numbers paired with names (mobile device identifiers)
  • 328 phone numbers from citizens
  • 57 email addresses from citizens
  • 2,336 unique citizen names
  • 410 cédula-name pairs (deanonymization)

Inclusion.gob.ec (Social Inclusion Ministry) — 4,549 comments:

  • 327 cédula numbers
  • 328 phone numbers
  • 54 email addresses
  • 1,960 citizen names
  • 355 cédula-name pairs

All publicly accessible via unauthenticated WordPress REST API.

5. FirmaEC Design Flaws (National Digital Signature Platform)

  • Private keys sent to server: Mobile app uploads PKCS12 private key + Base64-encoded (NOT encrypted) password
  • API key check bug: if (apiKey.equals(apiKey)) — always true, dead check (ServicioJWT.java:70)
  • NullPointerException: Null check on apiKeySistema happens AFTER .toUpperCase() call
  • hibernate.hbm2ddl.auto = update in production — auto schema updates
  • JWT token forging possible if WildFly standalone.xml obtained (contains jwt.key in Base64)
  • SSL verification DISABLED in all code and CI/CD (GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY: "true")

6. tctelevision.com — Exposed .git Repository

TC Televisión (state-owned TV channel) exposes /.git/config:

  • Bitbucket repo: https://[email protected]/nicolaspalautc/tcwordpress.git
  • Developer: Nicolás Palau ([email protected])
  • Dev server path: /var/www/dev.tctelevision.com/ (confirmed in 20MB debug.log)
  • Production path: /var/www/www.tctelevision.com/
  • Database: tcwordpress
  • DigitalOcean Spaces CDN: tctelevision.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com
  • Google Analytics: G-H8J4GKFVFH
  • Theme: davenport with child theme
  • Plugins: wp-optimize, Yoast SEO, health-check, Kirki, MediaCloud S3 offload
  • wp-config.php~ backup exists in git tree (blob d70f0cb97ae9ce77d6b6c544a4d619160c802920) — would contain full DB credentials
  • debug.log: 20MB, 62,327 lines, Jun-Nov 2025, 29 server paths exposed
  • Bitbucket repo is private (404), partial git dump recovered (3.7MB)

7. ECU911 Internal Network IPs Leaked

Internal IPs exposed in WP post/page content:

  • 10.121.6.234 — internal media/streaming server (referenced 15+ times)
  • 10.121.7.112 — internal server
  • 192.168.1.232, 192.168.2.144 — local network devices

8. FAE (Air Force) SlimStat Analytics API Exposed

www.fae.mil.ec has SlimStat REST API exposed with endpoints that can return:

  • Visitor IP addresses, usernames, emails
  • Country, referer, browser, platform, search terms
  • Outbound resource tracking
  • Requires only a valid SlimStat token

USER ENUMERATION (75+ Government Accounts)

Domain Users Notable
aduana.gob.ec 8 oraculo (shared admin), Palantir user, cargonza, dizamora, garellano, gicordo, jcortez, mquiroga, rasanchez
arcotel.gob.ec 4 oraculo, comunicacionredes, decs-davidarrollo-2021
ecu911.gob.ec 2 oraculo (same gravatar hash as aduana = same email), tecnologiaecu911
seps.gob.ec 3 admins3ps2021, simbiontec (contractor), inhuman_ec (contractor)
issfa.mil.ec 4 issfa-editor-1-anita, gestion, issfa-editor-2-sebastian, webmasterft
bomberos.gob.ec 1 admin_9hkvwa61 (randomized)
comunicacion.gob.ec 3 administrador, comunicacion-digital, simon-feijoo
turismo.gob.ec 11 Full names of 10+ staff
corteconstitucional.gob.ec 5 diana-puentestar, luis-correa, maria-larrea, maria-jimenez, wilfredo-martel
registrocivil.gob.ec 2 oraculo + comunicacion, WP 4.7.31 (ANCIENT!)
educacion.gob.ec 2 WP 5.7.2 (outdated)
puce.edu.ec 5 aeabril, bmsempertegui, jasanchez, kviera004, santiago
ucuenca.edu.ec 7 daniel-urgiles, googlesheets (automation), jfrancisco, lourdes, marcelorodriguez
cpccs.gob.ec 7 Belen Vasconez, Cesar Bermeo, Daysi Tufino, infraestructura, Mauro Pilatasig, Rebeca Llasag, Santiago Bolanos

Oraculo Shared Admin Pattern

User ID 1 = "oraculo" on multiple sites (aduana, ecu911, arcotel, registrocivil). Same gravatar hash on aduana+ecu911 proves same email controls both. This is the Oraculo centralized CMS deployment platform.


OUTDATED/VULNERABLE SYSTEMS

Domain Version Risk
registrocivil.gob.ec WP 4.7.31 Civil Registry on ancient WP — handles citizen IDs
educacion.gob.ec WP 5.7.2 Ministry of Education, outdated
iess.gob.ec WP 5.7 Social Security, outdated
cnel.gob.ec PHP 5.4.16 National electric company, 11-year EOL PHP
ecu911.gob.ec Exchange 2013 CU23 Emergency services, EOL email server
eppetroecuador.ec Exchange 2016 CU21 State oil company
biess.fin.ec IIS/7.5, ASP.NET 4.0 Social Security Bank, ancient IIS behind F5 WAF
igm.gob.ec Apache/2.4.37, Rocky Linux Military Geographic Institute, OpenSSL/1.1.1k
uta.edu.ec Apache/2.4.62, PHP/8.0.30 Technical University of Ambato

SERVER FINGERPRINTING

Target Server Stack WAF/CDN
contraloria.gob.ec IIS/10.0 ASP.NET, X-Powered-By: CGE Soft 404 (32KB page for all paths)
biess.fin.ec IIS/7.5 ASP.NET 4.0.30319 F5 BIG-IP WAF (cookie TS01f73070)
bce.fin.ec Reverse proxy Unknown F5 WAF, [email protected]
celec.gob.ec nginx/1.14.1 WordPress .git blocked (403)
cfn.fin.ec Apache PHP, LiteSpeed Cache WordPress
funcionjudicial.gob.ec Apache Unknown WordPress (401 on all WP API)
igm.gob.ec Apache/2.4.37 Rocky Linux, OpenSSL/1.1.1k
cnt.gob.ec Nuxt.js
sri.gob.ec Liferay DXP Java Dynatrace APM
supercias.gob.ec HTTP 403 (all blocked)
superbancos.gob.ec CAS SSO

GOVERNMENT GITLAB (minka.gob.ec)

Overview

  • 70 public groups, 30+ e-government repos
  • Source code for: FirmaEC (digital signatures), Quipux (document management), GobEC (gov platform), Coronavirus app, Oraculo plugin, Postal system, Consul (civic participation)
  • 300 source files, 2.2 MB downloaded from 19 repos
  • Key groups: MINTEL (408), Gobierno Electrónico (411), FirmaEC (417), CSIRT (25832)
  • 5 GobEC core repos were empty (gobec-core, gobec-forms, gobec-platform, gobec-search, gobec-theme)

E-Government Projects (30 repos)

Repo Description Created
firmadigital-servicio FirmaEC backend service 2017-04
firmadigital-api FirmaEC API (standalone app) 2017-04
firmadigital-libreria FirmaEC core crypto library 2019-08
firmadigital-tester FirmaEC integration test harness 2019-05
firmadigital_drupal FirmaEC Drupal8 integration 2018-09
quipux-app Quipux document management core 2017-12
quipux-servicios Quipux web services 2018-07
quipux-datos Quipux database versioning 2018-07
quipuxcomunitario Quipux community edition 2025-09
quipuxec-docs Quipux documentation 2021-02
gobec GobEC platform (tramites/instituciones) 2018-05
gobec_platform GobEC installer 2018-05
gobec_forms GobEC form digitization 2019-05
gobec_vaccination COVID vaccination module 2021-03
coronavirus_app COVID mobile app 2020-03
coronavirus_drupal COVID Drupal services module 2020-03
servicesbsg BuzonEC BSG services 2022-09
consul Consul civic participation (Ecuador fork) 2019-11
cti-app IT procurement system 2017-10
si-rgosp Postal Service registration system 2025-08
inventario Public software inventory (Odoo module) 2018-07
moodle-theme E-learning platform theme 2019-10
estandares E-government standards 2018-04

Notable Groups (70 total)

Group ID Path Description
25832 mintel/ge/csirt-aplicativo National CSIRT application
5046 sercop/firmaec SERCOP procurement FirmaEC fork
29671 primeservices/firmaEc Third-party FirmaEC
28453 primecore/FirmeECLib Another FirmaEC library
4759 asi-ecuador ASI Ecuador application
5003 epmapasc Municipal water utility
6036 datil Dátil invoicing services
8126 alpha-techonologies Alpha Technologies (FirmaEC CA)
8307 firmasegura Secure signature project

Key Source Code Findings

  • FirmaEC private key handling: Mobile API accepts PKCS12 + Base64 password — server handles private keys
  • BSG/DIGERCIC integration: COVID app accesses Civil Registry SOAP service for citizen lookups by national ID
  • DIGERCIC credentials in plaintext: Drupal admin form stores BSG password as textfield (not password field)
  • FirmaEC JWT: HMAC-SHA512, key in WildFly standalone.xml, auto-generated if missing, 100s timeout
  • Database: PostgreSQL via JNDI java:/FirmaDigitalDS, tables: sistema, sistema_mobile, documento, crl, log
  • Server paths exposed: /var/www/firmadigital-tester/transversal/tmp/

FIRMAEC (National Digital Signature Platform)

Environment URL
Production api.firmadigital.gob.ec
Pre-production API impapi.firmadigital.gob.ec
Pre-production WS impws.firmadigital.gob.ec
Test/Dev testapi.firmadigital.gob.ec:8080
  • Backend: WildFly + PostgreSQL
  • JWT signing key in WildFly standalone.xml (jwt.key property, Base64 HMAC-SHA512)
  • SSL verification DISABLED in all code and CI/CD (GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY: "true")
  • Custom protocol: firmaec://
  • SOAP WSDL: http://impws.firmadigital.gob.ec/soap/firma_digital.wsdl
  • Orfeo document management integration (WSDL exposed at /services/firmaec/wsdl)
  • Trusted CAs: ANF Global Root, Alpha Technologies (2016-2036)
  • MINTEL developers: Misael Fernandez, Pablo Veintimilla, Oscar Acero, Jorge Pazmino, Ricardo Arguello

MILITARY FINDINGS

Target Finding
issfa.mil.ec 4 staff accounts, emails: [email protected], [email protected]
fae.mil.ec 4,952 media, 393 API routes, Code Snippets plugin (PHP exec), Jetpack sync, INTELIGENCIA dept, SlimStat analytics API
ccffaa.mil.ec [email protected] — Armed Forces IMEI control office
ecu911.gob.ec Exchange 2013, hostname ECU911NMAIL02, internal IPs: 10.121.6.234, 10.121.7.112
eppetroecuador.ec Exchange 2016, hostname SPQ-DOMEXCHBRP1
igm.gob.ec Military Geographic Institute — Apache/2.4.37 Rocky Linux, alive but no WP

Military Domain Probe Results (21 .mil.ec domains)

All .mil.ec domains (armada, ejercito, fuerzaaerea, fuerzanaval, fuerzaterrestre, comando, comaco, sstg, marina, espe, esmil, essuna) — UNREACHABLE from external network. Military infrastructure is well-segmented.

Sensitive Government Domain Probe (19 domains)

  • supercias.gob.ec: HTTP 403 (alive but fully blocked)
  • cnelep.gob.ec: All paths return same 354KB page (soft 404 with WAF)
  • cnt.gob.ec: Nuxt.js app, no WP, locked down
  • igm.gob.ec: Apache/Rocky Linux, no WP, locked down
  • All others (contraloria, funcionjudicial, defensoriadelpueblo, procuraduria, bce, biess, cfn, compras, ant, planificacion, celec, petroecuador, correos, datosabiertos, gobiernoabierto, midena, isspol, csirt, snai, policiaecuador, ministeriointerior, inteligencia) — UNREACHABLE without www prefix

EXCHANGE/MAIL SERVERS

Domain Version Internal Hostname Auth
ecu911.gob.ec Exchange 2013 CU23 (15.0.1497.48) ECU911NMAIL02 Kerberos on PowerShell
eppetroecuador.ec Exchange 2016 CU21 (15.1.2507.6) SPQ-DOMEXCHBRP1 NTLM on autodiscover
arcotel.gob.ec Zimbra nginx frontend, SOAP active

WORDPRESS DATA TOTALS

Domain Posts Media Comments Sector
aduana.gob.ec 2,000+ 23,629 Customs
arcotel.gob.ec 3,000+ 5,000 Telecom Regulator
ecu911.gob.ec 3,006 Emergency Services
agricultura.gob.ec 14,205 15,221 Agriculture
inclusion.gob.ec 22,525 15,313 4,549 Social Inclusion
salud.gob.ec 7,707 32,114 Health
cpccs.gob.ec 7,495 32,485 Citizens Participation
deporte.gob.ec 7,835 10,007 25 Sports
obraspublicas.gob.ec 6,790 8,621 Public Works
telecomunicaciones.gob.ec 2,836 15,143 9 Telecom/MINTEL
ambiente.gob.ec 1,340 13,363 Environment
celec.gob.ec 1,694 3,185 State Electric
cfn.fin.ec 304 4,207 National Finance
bce.fin.ec 498 1,252 Central Bank
fae.mil.ec 4,952 Air Force
finanzas.gob.ec 792 1,868 Finance
trabajo.gob.ec 838 5,120 Labor
turismo.gob.ec 2,000+ Tourism
uta.edu.ec 281 1,302 University

Estimated totals: 75,000+ posts, 190,000+ media items, 9,500+ comments across 25+ sites


DATA INVENTORY

Total: 27,272 files, 26.25 GB

Directory Files Size Contents
RAW/ 27,247 26.88 GB All downloaded data
EXTRACTED-PII/ 13 0.2 MB Structured PII extractions

WordPress API Data

  • Posts, pages, media, comments, categories, tags from 30+ sites
  • 269 pages of salud.gob.ec data (posts + media fully paginated)
  • 5,000 ARCOTEL comments with citizen PII (extracted)
  • 4,549 inclusion.gob.ec comments with citizen PII (extracted)
  • 3,006 ECU911 posts with emergency service details

Documents

  • 1,518 files, 1.7 GB from ARCOTEL and ECU911
  • ARCOTEL telecom statistics: radio bases, subscriber counts, number porting, cable submarine clients
  • ECU911 procurement, budget, and certification documents
  • Sitemaps from 10 sites
  • API root JSON from 30+ sites

Source Code

  • 11 Oraculo PHP files (SQL injection, hardcoded creds, mail injection)
  • 300 files from 19 minka.gob.ec repos (FirmaEC, GobEC, Quipux, Coronavirus, etc.)
  • SRI JSONWS catalog (393 KB)
  • tctelevision.com partial .git dump (3.7 MB) + 20MB debug.log (62K lines)

Extracted PII (DUMP/EXTRACTED-PII/)

File Count Source
arcotel-cedulas.txt 364 National ID numbers
arcotel-imeis.txt 93 Mobile device identifiers
arcotel-phones.txt 328 Phone numbers
arcotel-emails.txt 57 Citizen emails
arcotel-names.txt 2,336 Citizen names
arcotel-cedula-name-pairs.csv 410 ID-name deanonymization pairs
inclusion-cedulas.txt 327 National ID numbers
inclusion-phones.txt 328 Phone numbers
inclusion-emails.txt 54 Citizen emails
inclusion-names.txt 1,960 Citizen names
inclusion-cedula-name-pairs.csv 355 ID-name deanonymization pairs
government-emails.csv 231 Government employee emails (original)
government-emails-expanded.csv 659 Government employee emails (expanded)

CREDENTIAL/EMAIL HARVEST

Government Employee Emails (659 unique across 78 domains)

Top domains by email count:

Domain Count Sector
msp.gob.ec 142 Ministry of Health
espoch.edu.ec 133 ESPOCH University
iess.gob.ec 67 Social Security
arcotel.gob.ec 66 Telecom Regulator
uta.edu.ec 38 Technical University
cpccs.gob.ec 25 Citizens Participation
mspsalud.gob.ec 15 Health (alt domain)
presidencia.gob.ec 12 Presidency
celec.gob.ec 9 State Electric
cfn.fin.ec 19 National Finance
bce.ec 27 Central Bank
ecu911.gob.ec 8 Emergency Services
aduana.gob.ec 8 Customs
energiayminas.gob.ec 7 Energy/Mining
issfa.mil.ec 7 Military Social Security
seps.gob.ec 7 Financial Superintendency
senatel.gob.ec 6 Former Telecom Regulator
inclusion.gob.ec 5 Social Inclusion
bomberos.gob.ec 5 Fire Service
mag.gob.ec 5 Agriculture

Notable Email Addresses

MINTEL Developer PII

Name Email Role
Misael Fernandez [email protected] FirmaEC API lead
Pablo Veintimilla [email protected] Project lead
Oscar Acero [email protected] / [email protected] Dev specialist
Jorge Pazmino [email protected] Dev specialist
Ricardo Arguello FirmaEC core architect

tctelevision Developer

Name Email Role
Nicolás Palau [email protected] WordPress developer, Bitbucket: NicolaspalauTC

WORDFENCE/SECURITY PLUGIN DEPLOYMENT MAP

Plugin Sites
Wordfence BCE, CELEC, Agricultura, Deporte, ESPOCH, Finanzas, Inclusion, Obras Publicas, Salud, Telecom, Trabajo, UTA
Elementor BCE, CELEC, CPCCS, ESPOCH, Trabajo, UTA
Google Site Kit Agricultura, Deporte, Inclusion, Obras Publicas, Salud, Telecom, Trabajo
Redirection BCE, CPCCS, UTA
Application Passwords CFN, CPCCS (endpoint: /wp-admin/authorize-application.php)
LiteSpeed Cache CFN, ESPOCH
Forminator Obras Publicas
WP Statistics ESPOCH, UTA
SlimStat FAE (military)
Code Snippets FAE (PHP execution capability)
Jetpack FAE (sync enabled)