תקציר מנהלים
Venezuela operates one of the most sophisticated sanctions-evasion ecosystems in the world, spanning both maritime and aviation domains. Through a combination of aging “dark fleet” tankers, state-owned PDVSA vessels, licensed Chevron-chartered ships, and a constellation of private and regime-linked aircraft, the Bolivarian government has built parallel logistics networks for oil exports and narcotics trafficking that operate largely outside international oversight. This investigation catalogs over 70 maritime vessels and 60+ aircraft identified through open-source intelligence by ODINT, classifying them by operational role and risk profile.
The Dark Fleet — Maritime עקיפת סנקציות
What Is the Dark Fleet…
The “dark fleet” (also called the “shadow fleet” or “ghost fleet”) refers to a global network of aging oil tankers that transport crude from sanctioned nations—primarily Russia, Iran, and Venezuela—while evading international tracking and insurance frameworks. These vessels share common characteristics:
- Aged tonnage: Most are 15–25 years old, well past the age accepted by mainstream insurers and classification societies.
- Opaque ownership: Registered through shell companies in jurisdictions like the UAE, Seychelles, Liberia, and Hong Kong.
- Flags of convenience: Registered under Guinea, Comoros, Panama, Togo, Cameroon, Bolivia, and other regulatory havens that provide minimal oversight.
- No Western P&I insurance: Operating without the Protection & Indemnity coverage required by major ports and the International Group of P&I Clubs.
The shadow fleet expanded by roughly 45% in the year ending mid-2025, driven largely by the cascading sanctions from the Russia-Ukraine war. Estimates suggest 218 tankers were involved in Venezuela-related crude movements in a single 12-month period, with close to 80% exhibiting at least one “dark activity.” Factoring in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, up to 10% of the global tanker fleet may be associated with Venezuelan cargo transport.
AIS Manipulation and Deceptive Shipping Practices
The vessels tracked in this investigation employ several layers of electronic deception:
| Technique | Description | Detection Method |
|---|---|---|
| Going Dark | Crew manually disables AIS transponder, creating signal gaps | Algorithmic gap analysis; satellite SAR imagery |
| זיוף AIS | False coordinates broadcast to place vessel digitally in safe waters while physically loading at sanctioned terminals | Cross-referencing AIS with satellite imagery (Sentinel-1, commercial SAR) |
| Circle Spoofing | Automated software generates fake circular holding patterns | Geometric anomaly detection |
| GNSS Manipulation | False GPS coordinates fed into the ship’s transponder system, allowing it to “jump” across oceans | Multi-source correlation (Kpler, TankerTrackers, satellite) |
| Identity Laundering (“Zombie” Vessels) | Operators purchase MMSI numbers from scrapped ships and program them into active tankers | IMO cross-referencing with scrapping databases |
| החלפת דגלים | Rapidly changing registration between flags of convenience to outpace regulatory blacklists | Flag-state change frequency analysis |
A striking example: when U.S. forces seized the VLCC Skipper off the Venezuelan coast on December 10, 2025, its AIS transponder was broadcasting coordinates placing it near Guyana and Suriname—500 nautical miles from its actual position at Venezuela’s José terminal, where satellite imagery confirmed it was loading sanctioned crude.
ODINT Vessel Catalog
Sanctioned Vessels
The following vessels have been identified through monitoring as sanctioned by one or more of OFAC (USA), OFSI (UK), or the European Union, and were observed operating in or near Venezuelan waters:
| Vessel Name | IMO | MMSI | Flag | Sanctions | Key Intelligence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XANTHOS EOS | 9231212 | 306761000 | Curaçao/Panama | OFAC, EU, UK | Arrived Amuay mid-September 2025; previously transported Russian crude; owned by Merluza Group Limited (sanctioned Jan 2025) |
| TITAN SPIRIT | 9412905 | — | — | Sanctions/OSINT listed | Tracked in Middle East–Caribbean corridor; last seen near UAE waters Sep 2025 |
| HAPPY LADY | 9005479 | — | — | Sanctions coverage | Tracked in Mediterranean/Eastern routes; last AIS signal Sep 2025 |
| GRACE 1 | 9116412 | — | — | Historical sanctions | The Iranian supertanker detained by Gibraltar in July 2019 while carrying 2 million barrels of crude bound for Syria; became a symbol of sanctions enforcement |
| AMUAY SENTINEL | 9422210 | — | — | Sanctioned/alias tracking | Arrivals at Paraguaná peninsula auditable; last seen Sep 2025 |
| CARDON SENTINEL | 9422211 | — | — | Sanctioned/dual verification | Arrivals at Cardón refinery complex; last seen Sep 2025 |
כלי שיט של הצי האפל (Unverified/ODINT-Tracked)
These vessels were identified through ODINT monitoring in Caribbean waters with behavioral anomalies consistent with dark fleet operations:
| Vessel Name | IMO | Category | Last Known Position | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERNAL (ALT) | 9232888 | Dark fleet | 24.90°N, 56.30°W (UAE area) | Shadow fleet; UK/EU sanctions; alias tracking |
| KOALA (ALT) | 9230423 | Dark fleet | 26.20°N, 55.80°W | Shadow fleet; identity change 2025 |
| PHOENIX VOYAGER | 9245678 | Dark fleet | 11.90°N, 66.50°W (Caribbean) | OSINT-tracked Caribbean operations |
| ODYSSEY | 9234567 | Dark fleet | 12.00°N, 70.90°W | Caribbean dark fleet activity |
| MIRAGE | 9234568 | Dark fleet | 11.50°N, 69.80°W | Caribbean dark fleet activity |
| ORION | 9234569 | Dark fleet | 12.20°N, 64.50°W | Caribbean dark fleet activity |
| BALTIC SUN | 9302145 | Dark fleet | 12.50°N, 60.80°W | Listed by NGOs |
| ARCTIC SEA | 9302146 | Dark fleet | 13.10°N, 57.00°W | Listed by NGOs |
| NORDIC SKY | 9302147 | Dark fleet | 14.20°N, 55.50°W | Listed by NGOs |
| BLACK PEARL | 9302148 | Dark fleet | 15.10°N, 53.20°W | Listed by NGOs |
| RED SEA | 9302149 | Dark fleet | 16.00°N, 51.10°W | Listed by NGOs |
| CUBAN ALLY | 9309981 | Dark fleet | 19.80°N, 75.80°W (Cuba) | Cuba resupply via dark fleet |
| GULF TRADER | 9317782 | Dark fleet | 20.00°N, 75.00°W | Venezuela–Cuba STS routes 2024/2025 |
The Cuba-bound vessels are particularly significant. The Venezuelan regime uses a clandestine network of tankers to maintain crude shipments to Havana, with a single Cuban-flagged tanker tracked moving over 300,000 barrels from Venezuela in one month—vastly exceeding official export figures.
ODINT uses its own tools to track these vessels
PDVSA State Fleet
Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA operates its own fleet of tankers through its subsidiary PDV Marina, supplemented by foreign-flagged vessels under exclusive charter. These vessels shuttle crude between Venezuela’s eight major oil ports (José, Amuay, Cardón, Puerto La Cruz, El Palito, Bajo Grande, and others) and handle export loadings:
| Vessel Name | IMO | Terminal/Region | Last Seen | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CARABOBO | 9524114 | Falcón/Zulia | — | PDVSA fleet; multiple port calls |
| TAMANACO | 9524102 | — | — | PDVSA fleet |
| NEGRA HIPOLITA | 9274356 | — | — | PDVSA fleet |
| CUMANÁ II | 9303153 | Puerto La Cruz | Sep 3, 2025 | 10.46°N, 64.19°W |
| LLANOS | 9303101 | Western Venezuela | Sep 4, 2025 | Export window Sep 2025; 10.70°N, 71.60°W |
| ANACO II | 9303127 | PLC–El Palito | Sep 3, 2025 | Activity surge Sep 2025 |
| CARIPITO | 9303139 | Eastern Venezuela | Sep 2, 2025 | PDVSA Oriente |
| PARIA BAY | 9303164 | Eastern Caribbean | Sep 5, 2025 | STS transfer zone |
| PUERTO MIRANDA | 9303145 | Gulf of Venezuela | Apr 28, 2025 | Queuing delays reported Apr 2025 |
The full PDVSA fleet catalog includes dozens of additional vessels (PITIGUAO, MORICHAL, BOYACA, MARA, CATATUMBO, ZULIA, GUAJIRA, CUMAREBO, PUNTA CARDON, AMUAY BAY, SAN FELIX, ANZOATEGUI, ORINOCO, CARIBE, LA GUAIRA, PUERTO CABELLO, PUERTO SUCRE, LOS ROQUES, and others). Ten foreign-flagged vessels were found sailing exclusively between Venezuela’s eight oil ports on behalf of PDV Marina, most registered in Panama and Comoros by shipping companies from the UAE.
Chevron-Licensed Vessels
Following the restricted U.S. license granted to Chevron in July 2025, a fleet of tankers resumed operations at Venezuelan terminals.
| Vessel Name | IMO | Flag | Key Intelligence |
|---|---|---|---|
| CANOPUS VOYAGER | 9452227 | Bahamas | First to load Hamaca heavy crude under new license, Aug 12, 2025 at José terminal |
| MEDITERRANEAN VOYAGER | 9411975 | Bahamas | Loaded Boscán heavy crude at Bajo Grande, Aug 2025 |
| CANOPUS VOYAGER II | 9452239 | — | Chevron-chartered window Aug–Sep 2025 |
| MEDITERRANEAN VOYAGER II | 9411987 | — | Chevron-chartered flow Aug 2025 |
| HAMACA TRADER | 9430021 | — | Loading Hamaca crude post-license |
| BOSCAN LIFTER | 9427765 | — | Loading Boscán crude post-license |
| ORINOCO CARRIER | 9345670 | — | Chevron/PDVSA flows Aug–Sep 2025 |
Additional Chevron-chartered vessels in the operational fleet include BOSCAN CARRIER, HAMACA CARRIER, GEORGE T, SEA LION, AVON, HIGHLANDER, POINT FORTIN, NABUCCO, CARIBBEAN PIONEER, CEDAR, MONGOOSE, PEREGRINE, HARRIER, FALCON, and CONDOR. Reuters and LSEG data confirmed at least five vessels navigating toward Venezuelan waters simultaneously in August 2025, with additional ships staging at Aruba—a common hub for העברות ספינה-לספינה of Venezuelan crude.
The Narco Planes — Aviation ODINT
Venezuela as a Narco-Aviation Hub
Venezuela has long served as a critical air transit corridor for Colombian cocaine moving toward North America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Since 2019, Venezuelan armed forces have officially destroyed at least 21 aircraft within the country’s territory—12 confirmed to be U.S.-registered. By 2025, that figure climbed to at least 39 “narco planes” neutralized that year alone, according to official Venezuelan military statements.
The Cartel de los Soles facilitates this air corridor through a network of corrupt military officers who approve departures and arrivals of drug-carrying aircraft, manage aerial radar coverage to create “blind spots,” and control clandestine airstrips across border regions. Former First Lady Cilia Flores’s pilot, Yazenky Lamas, was extradited to the United States for providing air traffic codes that allowed cocaine planes to impersonate commercial flights—he was linked to “hundreds of drug flights.”
Regime and State Aircraft
The ODINT-tracked aircraft catalog reveals a complex hierarchy of state, regime, and private aviation assets:
Presidential and Senior Leadership Fleet
| ICAO/Registration | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| T7102X | New Maduro aircraft (replacement for seized plane) | Acquired after the U.S. seized two Dassault Falcon jets linked to Maduro in 2024–2025. The original YV3016/YV3360 aircraft were seized in the Dominican Republic |
| YV2984 | Presidential/entourage aircraft | Listed on OFAC’s SDN list as Conviasa blocked property since 2020 |
| YV1004 | Regime entourage aircraft | Conviasa SDN-listed |
| T777PR | PDVSA-purchased; Díaz-Canel Cuba flights | Used to transport Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel |
| YV654T | “Gift” to Díaz-Canel — Gulfstream G2 | Regime aircraft transferred as diplomatic gift to Cuba |
| YV3119 | Aircraft attributed to Diosdado Cabello | Cabello designated by U.S. with $25 million bounty; now Interior Minister overseeing anti-narcotics operations |
The seizure of Maduro’s aircraft represents a critical OSINT milestone. In September 2024, U.S. authorities seized a Dassault Falcon 900 described as “Venezuela’s Air Force One,” which had been purchased for $13 million through a shell company in violation of sanctions. In February 2025, Secretary Rubio personally oversaw the seizure of a second Dassault Falcon 2000EX (YV-3360) in Santo Domingo, which yielded intelligence including transponder data, flight manifests, and Venezuelan Air Force personnel records.
CONVIASA — The Sanctioned State Airline
CONVIASA (Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos) was designated under Executive Order 13884 in August 2019 and formally added to the SDN list in February 2020. The U.S. accused the airline of shuttling regime officials to North Korea, Cuba, and Iran. The OFAC listing includes 37+ aircraft: Airbus A319/A340, Boeing 737s, ATR42/72s, Embraer ERJ190s, Cessna 208 Grand Caravans, and DHC-7s.
Notable CONVIASA-linked tracked aircraft:
- YV3397: Ex-Conviasa, sanctioned; tracked to Isla Tortuga — a small Venezuelan island historically associated with clandestine operations
- ETR823/ETR8949H: Estelar airline aircraft with irregular behavior; the state-linked carrier operates Guyana routes
DGCIM Military Intelligence Aircraft
| Registration | Description | Route/Pattern |
|---|---|---|
| YV2770 | DGCIM (Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence) | Regime military intelligence flights |
| YV2707 | DGCIM | Military intelligence operations |
| YV2875 | DGCIM plant aircraft | Barinas route — border state with Colombia |
| YV3086 | Military | La Carlota military airfield to Porlamar (Margarita Island) |
| AMB0222 | Military | La Carlota airfield — primary Caracas military aviation hub |
Entourage and Political VIP Fleet
The ODINT data reveals a substantial fleet of private aircraft dedicated to regime VIP transport:
- YV3554, YV3399, YV3226, YV3218, YV3006, YV2630, YV3381, YV3562: Political entourage aircraft used for domestic regime travel
- YV1794: High-frequency regime usage
- YV2689: Regime aircraft reportedly used by Kimberly Delgado — a politically connected figure
- YV3173: Linked to Aristóbulo Istúriz faction / Barquisimeto chavistas
ODINT uses its own tools to track suspicious aircraft in Latin America
Narco-Linked and Suspicious Aircraft
סחר בסמים and Gold Smuggling Indicators
| Registration | Description | Risk Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| YV3088 | Unknown — Guyana narco/gold route | Guyana border region is epicenter of illegal mining and gold-for-drugs exchanges |
| YV3457 | Unknown — Mexico narco/gold route | Mexico corridor for drug and gold laundering |
| YV3025 | Regime — gold, Ciudad Guayana | CVG (Corporación Venezolana de Guayana) mineral extraction zone |
| YV0138 | CVG minerals-related | Linked to state mining operations in Bolívar state |
| YV3514 | International narco; surrendered to U.S. military | The only aircraft in the catalog with confirmed U.S. military involvement |
| YV3379 | Guanare route — suspected narco | Portuguesa state — known drug transit corridor from Colombian border |
| YV3044 | Rare route toward Guayana | Southern Venezuela — mining and trafficking zone |
Ghost Aircraft and Identity Manipulation
| Identifier | Description | OSINT Concern |
|---|---|---|
| 0d8605 | No identification — private airfield departure | Hex code only; no registration data — maximum opacity |
| e48cbd | Brazilian aircraft — no info | Unresolved foreign hex code operating in Venezuelan airspace |
| 0d8487 | Resolves to YV654T — regime gift aircraft | Duplicate hex suggesting transponder manipulation or identity laundering |
| YV657T | Impersonating ETR823 (Estelar) | Active transponder spoofing: a private aircraft broadcasting an airline identity to avoid scrutiny |
| YV3089 | Rare — no hex code | Operating without any digital footprint |
The case of YV657T impersonating ETR823 mirrors maritime זיוף AIS tactics: a private aircraft broadcasting the identity of a commercial Estelar Airlines flight to mask its true nature. This technique was documented in the Yazenky Lamas prosecution, where narco pilots used air traffic codes to impersonate commercial flights.
International Routes of Concern
| Registration | Route | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| BOV1751 | Havana–Venezuela–Santa Cruz (Bolivia) | Tri-national narco corridor linking Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivian coca production zones |
| OAE3244 | Deportee aircraft | UAE-linked transport |
| HI1001 | Dominican Republic — luxury private | DR has been a staging ground for regime aircraft seizures |
| HI1045 | Dominican Republic — used by Guaidó | Opposition-linked aircraft |
| YV2853 | EXC2853 — Regime, Lesser Antilles | Island-hopping route through the Eastern Caribbean |
| YV3404 | Constant flights to Cuba | Cuba resupply corridor — mirrors maritime Cuba dark fleet route |
| YV2692 | Regime — USA–Venezuela flights | Active U.S.–Venezuela route despite sanctions |
| YV1106 | Rare USA–Venezuela route | Anomalous U.S.–Venezuela flight activity |
| YV147T | Private CCS–Curaçao | Caracas to Curaçao — common offshore finance and STS transfer hub |
| AVA018 | Avianca commercial aircraft used by entourage | Commercial aviation exploited for regime VIP transport (hex: aace63) |
Convergence — Where the Dark Fleet Meets the Narco Planes
The Cartel de los Soles Nexus
The maritime and aviation networks documented in this investigation are not parallel systems—they are integrated components of the same state-criminal apparatus. The U.S. designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2025. But it was not just the cartel that used this corridor; different governments also used it to exploit resources, including the United States:
- Maritime corridors: Military officers approve ship departures, manage port access, and coordinate with dark fleet operators to export sanctioned crude.
- Aerial corridors: The same military structures manage radar coverage, issue air traffic codes, and operate clandestine airstrips to facilitate drug flights.
- Shared logistics: The Cuba-bound supply chain operates through both maritime (dark fleet tankers like CUBAN ALLY and GULF TRADER) and aviation (YV3404 constant Cuba flights, T777PR PDVSA-Cuba, YV654T Díaz-Canel aircraft) channels.
Key Geographic Nodes
The ODINT data clusters around several critical nodes:
- Paraguaná Peninsula (Amuay/Cardón): Venezuela’s largest refinery complex; arrival point for sanctioned tankers like XANTHOS EOS
- José Terminal (Anzoátegui): Primary crude export terminal; where the Skipper was loading when seized
- Gulf of Venezuela / Lake Maracaibo: Western oil export zone and narco-plane interception corridor
- Paria Peninsula / Eastern Caribbean: STS transfer zone for dark fleet vessels
- Aruba / Curaçao: Staging area for Chevron STS transfers and dark fleet operations
- Ciudad Guayana / Bolívar State: Gold mining zone; aircraft YV3025, YV3088, YV0138 operate here
- Cuba: Destination for both dark fleet oil tankers and regime aircraft
The UAE Connection
A recurring pattern across both maritime and aviation: the United Arab Emirates serves as the primary corporate haven for sanctions-evasion infrastructure. Asia Charm Limited FTZ alone operates 13 tankers in Venezuelan waters, and multiple other UAE-based firms (Kroeger Tankers, Julius Capital, Issa Shipping) manage sanctioned or stealth vessels. The UAE’s regulatory environment has enabled these operations to continue despite international scrutiny.
What ODINT Brings to the Table
The ODINT data cataloged here reveals the industrial scale of Venezuela’s dual-use logistics network. Over 70 maritime vessels span the full spectrum from sanctioned dark fleet tankers to state-owned PDVSA ships to licensed Chevron operations, while 60+ aircraft range from presidential jets to unidentified ghost planes on narco-trafficking routes. The convergence point is the Venezuelan state itself—through the Cartel de los Soles, the same military command structure that manages oil port access also controls aerial radar and clandestine airstrips.
But it also exposes governments on all sides: Russia, Iran, the United States, and even the United Arab Emirates used and will continue to use the trade corridor to take advantage of Venezuela’s wealth.
The U.S. enforcement campaign—from tanker seizures to the FTO designation—has disrupted but not dismantled these networks. The January 2026 breakout of 12 loaded tankers in dark mode demonstrates that the dark fleet adapts faster than enforcement can pursue. Meanwhile, on the aviation side, the regime’s ability to acquire replacement aircraft (T7102X after the Dassault seizures), spoof transponder identities (YV657T impersonating ETR823), and maintain constant Cuba flights (YV3404) suggests a system designed for resilience above all else.
Investigator's Note
This report is based entirely on open-source intelligence (OSINT). No classified information was accessed. No confidential sources were used. Everything documented here is publicly available — if you know where to look.