Iran, Russia & SEBIN: Venezuela’s Fiber Optic Network

The Unmarked Vans

In March 2022, unmarked white vans began appearing along the Caracas-La Guaira highway, one of Venezuela’s most strategic routes. No company logos. No permits displayed. Just crews working, digging trenches and laying fiber optic cables.

When competitors tried to investigate, they found nothing — no public records, no CONATEL announcements. By the time anyone realized what was happening, 28 kilometers of underground fiber infrastructure had been installed, connecting Venezuela’s main airport, its largest seaport, and the capital city’s downtown in a network that would soon be described by its own founders as “the largest project introduced to CONATEL in recent years.”

Covert fiber deployment along Venezuela’s most strategic highway corridor

The company behind this covert deployment was Telecomunicaciones G-Network, C.A., a fiber optic ISP founded in 2021 in Maiquetía, La Guaira state. But G-Network was never just another internet provider.

This investigation reveals how G-Network became a convergence point for Iranian telecommunications ambitions, Russian technical expertise, and the Venezuelan intelligence apparatus — specifically SEBIN, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service notorious for operating “La Tumba,” an underground torture facility documented by the United Nations.

The Founders — A Port Operator, an Engineer, and a Government Fixer

Francisco de Vita: The Logistics Kingpin

The story begins with Francisco de Vita, owner of GONAVI C.A. (Importadora y Transporte Gonavi), a logistics and customs warehousing company that controls critical nodes of Venezuela’s import infrastructure.

GONAVI operates:

• A 7,000 m² bonded warehouse authorized by SENIAT (tax authority) in Cabo Blanco, just 2.5 km from La Guaira Port
• A 5,452 m² air cargo warehouse inside Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía
• A subsidiary in Madrid, Spain: Importadora y Transporte Gonavi S.L., founded in 2010

GONAVI’s bonded warehouse and logistics operations

De Vita’s background is equally strategic. Between 2007 and 2009, he served as General Manager of La Guaira Terminal Service C.A., a joint venture between Danish shipping giant Maersk and a local Venezuelan stakeholder that operated as a customs warehouse inside La Guaira Port itself.

De Vita’s previous role at La Guaira Terminal Service C.A.

In other words: De Vita controlled — and still controls — access to Venezuela’s main air and sea gateways.

According to G-Network’s own podcast (G-Podcast, March 2025), it was De Vita who conceived the idea for the ISP. His businesses needed reliable internet. Traditional Venezuelan providers couldn’t deliver. So he decided to build his own network.

G-Podcast (March 2025) — De Vita’s founding narrative

Eduardo Castillo: The Technical Architect

Enter Eduardo Castillo, General Manager of ECH TELECOMUNICACIONES. Castillo met De Vita when the latter needed help solving connectivity issues across his logistics operations. “The problem with his businesses was the internet,” Castillo recalled in the podcast.

It was during this engagement that Castillo met Carlos Longa, a telecom executive who had worked for COMPUCELH SYSTEMS CA. Longa proposed an ambitious solution: deploy fiber optic infrastructure not just for De Vita’s businesses, but for the entire La Guaira region.

The founding trio behind G-Network’s formation

Carlos Longa: The Operator

Longa became Chief Operating Officer (COO) of G-Network and serves as the technical contact registered with LACNIC (Latin American and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry) for ASN 272122. His LinkedIn profile identifies him as “Ejecutivo” at Telecomunicaciones G-Network since September 2021, based in Maiquetía, Vargas state.

But Longa’s most revealing statement came during the August 2021 CONATEL licensing ceremony, where he represented G-Network. According to coverage by La Verdad de Vargas, Longa declared that the company would contribute to the La Guaira Government by “making our platform available to assist them with security matters.”

Security matters. Not connectivity. Not economic development. Security.

Longa’s statement at the CONATEL licensing ceremony, August 2021

The Fourth Founder: Governor José Alejandro Terán

If De Vita, Castillo, and Longa were the operational founders, José Alejandro Terán was the political godfather.

Born January 7, 1980 in La Guaira, Terán is a lawyer who graduated Summa Cum Laude from Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV). His career trajectory reads like a blueprint for Chavista loyalists:

• Legal Counsel to the Office of the President during Hugo Chávez’s administration
• Vice Minister of Sports
• Mayor of Vargas Municipality
• Governor of La Guaira state (re-elected May 2025 with 107,000 votes from the Gran Polo Patriótico coalition)
• Member of the National Directorate of PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), appointed directly by Nicolás Maduro
• Currently pursuing a PhD in “Integral Defense of the Nation” at the Bolivarian Military University (IAESEN)

In October 2022, Terán announced a formal agreement with G-Network to install 28 kilometers of fiber optic cable from Caraballeda to Catia la Mar. He framed it as part of “the Telecommunications Plan conceived by President Nicolás Maduro” and promised free internet for 52 schools, hospitals, plazas, and passenger terminals.

It was classic Chavista stagecraft: a private company executing state objectives under the mantle of social welfare, bankrolled by a port logistics operator with privileged access to customs infrastructure.

Governor Terán announcing the 28 km fiber optic deployment agreement, October 2022

The Covert Deployment

Four Months to Get a License

Deploying telecommunications infrastructure in Venezuela normally takes years. Layers of bureaucracy at CONATEL (the National Telecommunications Commission), environmental permits, municipal approvals, coordination with utilities.

G-Network got its license in four months.

“The fiber optic project was introduced to CONATEL driven by Francisco de Vita, and we obtained permits in just 4 months,” Eduardo Castillo revealed in the March 2025 podcast. The speed was “unusual,” he admitted — but he didn’t elaborate on how it happened.

The implication was clear: influence, not procedure, secured the authorization.

Unmarked Trucks and Strategic Concealment

The deployment itself was deliberately clandestine. In the podcast, Castillo described how “we used unmarked vans to take advantage of installing infrastructure without allowing the competition to participate.”

This wasn’t about market advantage. It was about installing critical telecommunications backbone along one of Venezuela’s most strategic corridors without public scrutiny, regulatory oversight, or competitive bidding.

The target: the Caracas-La Guaira highway.

The Caracas-La Guaira highway — target of the covert fiber optic deployment

“The Roads Belong to Them”

As G-Network’s expansion accelerated, it hit resistance. Castillo recounted a pivotal moment: “We expanded so much that someone from a ministry — I won’t say which — told us: ‘You can’t advance because the main roads of Caracas belong to them.’”

“Them.” The existing telecommunications oligopoly… The military… CANTV, the state-owned telecom… Castillo didn’t specify.

But the confrontation forced G-Network to go directly to ministerial authorities. “That led us to get involved with the ministry,” Castillo said. The result: approval to continue — but under strict conditions.

The Presidential Highway

The Caracas route, Castillo explained, wasn’t ordinary infrastructure. “The Caracas project is interesting because it’s a main highway, a presidential highway, a ministry highway, and it’s sensitive because of the security requirements.”

Because of this sensitivity, aerial fiber deployment — the cheaper, faster method — was prohibited. G-Network was required to use trenched fiber, burying cables underground at significantly higher cost.

Why… Trenched fiber is harder to sabotage, harder to tap, and invisible. It’s the infrastructure you use when you don’t want anyone to know where the cables run — or what they’re carrying.

Longa added: “We’re the fourth company to go up the Caracas-La Guaira route which is 17 km long with our own trenching. We started buying offices and buildings.”

G-Network wasn’t just an ISP. It was acquiring real estate and digging into Venezuela’s most protected infrastructure corridor.

Trenched fiber deployment along the Caracas-La Guaira presidential highway corridor

The Russian Consultant

Vadim Sidorov — VoGTU Engineer

Among the 16+ employees identified through open-source intelligence, one stands out: Vadim Sidorov (Сидоров Вадим).

Vadim Sidorov — Russian consultant at Telecomunicaciones G-Network

His LinkedIn profile lists him as “Консультант” (Consultant) at Telecomunicaciones G-Network, C.A. His location: Maiquetía, Vargas, Venezuela. His alma mater: VoGTU — Volgograd State Technical University (also known as VSTU), located in Volgograd, Russia.

VoGTU is a major Russian engineering university with a strong focus on software engineering, telecommunications, and industrial systems.

The presence of a Russian technical consultant at a Venezuelan ISP might seem unremarkable in isolation. But context matters.

Russia-Venezuela Intelligence Cooperation

In November 2025, Russia and Venezuela signed a bilateral cooperation agreement (Gaceta N.6.930) that explicitly includes counterintelligence collaboration. Moscow committed to providing Caracas with “sophisticated equipment” for intelligence operations.

One month earlier, in October 2025, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a comprehensive strategic treaty with Russia covering energy, defense, technology, and the economy.

It has been documented how the Venezuelan government, particularly through CANTV (the state telecom monopoly), has used Russian and Italian technology to monitor emails, keywords, and phone conversations of citizens. CANTV controls approximately 70% of Venezuela’s internet traffic.

Sidorov’s role at G-Network fits this pattern. Whether he’s providing technical guidance, systems architecture, or something more operational remains unclear from open sources. But his presence is no coincidence.

Russia-Venezuela bilateral cooperation framework — intelligence and technology agreements

The Iran Connection — Venefibra

The Fitelven Agreement (September 2024)

The most visible international partnership involving La Guaira’s telecom ecosystem began in September 2024 at the II International Telecommunications Fair (Fitelven), held in Caracas.

At this event, letters of intent were signed between:

• MDC (Modern Data Centers / Centro de Datos Modernos Novin) — an Iranian technology firm
• CANTV — Venezuela’s state telecom
• Corpostel — the state telecommunications corporation
• The Government of La Guaira — represented by Governor Terán

Present at the signing:

• Ali Kianpour, President of MDC
• Major General Jorge Márquez, Vice President for Public Works and Services, President of Corpostel
• Major General Jesús Aldana, President of CANTV
• José Alejandro Terán, Governor of La Guaira
• Ali Chegini, Iranian Ambassador to Venezuela (as of 2025)

The stated goal: establish a fiber optic cable manufacturing plant in La Guaira. This is a partnership they are trying to hide — as evidenced by the MYNCIT webpage — but the ODINT team recovered images of the telecommunications fair where José Alejandro Terán is at the center of the agreement.

II International Telecommunications Fair (Fitelven), September 2024

Letters of intent signing between Iranian and Venezuelan parties

ODINT-recovered images showing Terán at the center of the Iran-Venezuela fiber optic agreement

The Bilateral Agreement (October–November 2024)

In October 2024, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia, President Nicolás Maduro met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to review bilateral agreements. The fiber optic project was high on the agenda.

In November 2024, the agreement was formalized. Sayed Sattar Hashemi, Iran’s Minister of Information and Communications Technology, visited Venezuela alongside Iranian Ambassador Hojjatollah Soltani. They signed the official framework with Terán and Venezuelan officials.

The factory would be installed in the former Almacenadora Caracas facility in Catia la Mar — less than 5 km from G-Network’s headquarters.

Formalization of the Iran-Venezuela fiber optic manufacturing agreement

The Arrival of Equipment (July 2025)

In July 2025, the first of four production lines arrived at La Guaira Port — the same port where Francisco de Vita’s GONAVI operates its bonded warehouse.

The joint venture was formally named Venefibra, a triple alliance between:

1. CANTV (Venezuelan state)
2. MDC (Iranian private firm)
3. Government of La Guaira (regional government)

Venefibra production equipment arriving at La Guaira Port, July 2025

Operational Launch (August 2025)

By August 2025, Minister Hashemi confirmed the factory was operational, with an investment of $10 million USD. The plant would produce fiber optic cables, with projected capacity to employ 150 workers and serve not just Venezuela but become a regional export hub for Latin America.

Hashemi stated: “Iran-based knowledge enterprises have activated in Venezuela’s communications infrastructure.”

November 2025: Official Approval

In November 2025, Venezuela officially approved the joint venture between the La Guaira Special Economic Zone and MDC, cementing the Iran-Venezuela fiber optic partnership as permanent infrastructure.

Strategic Implications

Amirhossein Mirabadi, head of the International Interactions Center of Iran’s Vice Presidency for Science, articulated the geopolitical dimension:

“With the inauguration of this plant, Iranian knowledge-based companies have established a presence in a region often described as the backyard of the United States.”

It wasn’t just about fiber. It was about projection.

Iran’s strategic telecommunications foothold in Latin America

Iran has also signed agreements with Oman to establish a data and internet corridor connecting Russia and Central Asia through Iran to the Persian Gulf, India, and East Africa — with an initial capacity of 4.5 terabits per second.

The implication: Venezuela’s telecommunications infrastructure could be integrated into a non-Western, authoritarian-controlled digital corridor spanning three continents.

ODINT Found the Critical Proof — The SEBIN Server

IP Address 38.61.255.205

In February 2026, a routine scan from the ODINT team of G-Network’s address space revealed something unexpected.

Within the block 38.61.128.0/17 — registered to Telecomunicaciones G-Network under ARIN OrgID TGC-66 — a single IP address was running an active web application: 38.61.255.205:5000.

An Nmap scan revealed:

• 985 TCP ports closed (returning RST packets)
• 14 TCP ports filtered (blocked by firewall)
• Port 5000: open, running a Flask/Python web application (Werkzeug 3.1.3, Python 3.13.5)

The application presented a login portal with the title “Iniciar Sesión” (Log In) in Spanish. HTTP responses included session cookies and a redirect to /login…next=%2F.

The server was configured to serve static resources via cdn.jsdelivr.net (a public CDN hosted by Fastly, ASN 54113). The SSL certificate was issued by GlobalSign, valid from June 2, 2025 to July 4, 2026.

Login portal discovered on G-Network IP 38.61.255.205:5000 — “Iniciar Sesión”

WHOIS and Network Analysis

A WHOIS query confirmed the IP belonged to:

• Organization: TELECOMUNICACIONES G-NETWORK, C.A. (TGC-66)
• Address: Edif Belenus 3000, La Guaira, Venezuela
• Phone: +58 0212 771 4341 / +58 242 289 6625
• Technical contact: [email protected]
• Abuse contact: [email protected]

The IP sits within a potential /22 CIDR block (38.61.252.0/22), suggesting a cluster of connected devices within G-Network’s infrastructure.

Co-Hosted Sites

Two other sites were found running on G-Network infrastructure:

1. gylsafe.com — IP 38.45.36.86 (within G-Network’s 38.45.32.0/21 block)
2. movilpayve.com — also on G-Network infrastructure, approximately 2 months old, currently under construction

Co-hosted sites discovered on G-Network address space

Technical fingerprinting revealed significant overlaps in stack configuration, deployment patterns, and security headers between these sites and 38.61.255.205.

ODINT Database

Following ODINT’s investigation into Venezuela’s critical state and telecommunications infrastructure, we were able to obtain important databases linking different actors in Venezuelan and international geopolitics. What is observed in this report is only the tip of the iceberg of how profound the information obtained by ODINT really is. This information is distributed to analysts, independent researchers, journalists, and competent authorities.

The Domain Creator: Detective Javier Ochoa

Investigation into the domain hosted at 38.61.255.205 revealed that it was created by Detective Javier Ochoa, an active member of SEBIN (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional — Bolivarian National Intelligence Service).

Ochoa is not a minor figure.

Detective Javier Ochoa — SEBIN officer linked to the G-Network domain

The Torture List

17 SEBIN Officers Accused of Human Rights Violations

Detective Javier Ochoa appears on a list of 17 SEBIN officers publicly identified by Venezuelan civil society organizations and independent media as perpetrators of torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial violence against political prisoners.

The list includes:

The UN Fact-Finding Mission

In September 2020, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela published a report documenting systematic human rights violations by Venezuelan security forces, including SEBIN.

Key findings:

• 33 documented cases of arbitrary detention and/or torture by SEBIN for political reasons
• 10 torture methods identified: severe beatings, asphyxiation with toxic substances (including pepper spray and tear gas), electric shocks (including to genitals), stress positions (known as “the octopus” and “crucifixion”), sexual violence (7 cases), and white torture (prolonged sensory deprivation and isolation)
• Torture was used to extract confessions, obtain information, and punish perceived political opposition
• SEBIN officers identified by name: Gustavo González López (SEBIN Director), Carlos Calderón Chirinos, Hannover Guerrero Mijares
• The report concluded that these acts constitute crimes against humanity, with direct involvement of President Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello (First Vice President of PSUV)
• At least 2 deaths in custody: Fernando Albán (2018, defenestration ruled suicide) and Rodolfo González

González López Is Not a Coincidence

The connection between Venezuela, Iran, and the SEBIN does not end there. After what happened on January 3, 2026, with Maduro’s capture by the US government, Delcy Rodríguez appointed General Gustavo González López as commander of the Presidential Guard of Honor (Military House) and head of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM). He replaced Javier Marcano Tábata and Iván Hernández Dala.

González López, formerly director of SEBIN (2019–2024) and Minister of the Interior and Justice (2015–2016), is recognized for his career in intelligence. But the key is here: during his time at SEBIN, when the agreements with Iran were signed, González López was the one who protected and helped the IRGC within Venezuela.

González López — the SEBIN-IRGC connection

La Tumba — The Underground Torture Facility

SEBIN’s headquarters in Plaza Venezuela, Caracas, houses a notorious underground detention facility known as “La Tumba” (“The Tomb”).

The facility consists of five floors below ground level, with cells measuring approximately 2×3 meters, equipped with permanent cameras and microphones, no natural light, and used for prolonged isolation.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR/CIDH) issued Resolution 6/2015 specifically addressing conditions at La Tumba, urging Venezuela to cease using it as a detention site and to ensure humane treatment of detainees.

Testimonies from former detainees describe white torture: constant lighting or total darkness, temperature manipulation, food deprivation, prohibition of family visits, and months of solitary confinement designed to break psychological resistance without leaving physical marks.

The 400-Meter Radius

Geographic Convergence

The coordinates of G-Network’s infrastructure in Caracas are 200–500 meters from the SEBIN website’s hosting location.

They also fall within approximately 400 meters of SEBIN headquarters at Plaza Venezuela, which houses La Tumba.

This proximity is not coincidental. Trenched fiber along the Caracas-La Guaira route would necessarily pass near or through SEBIN-controlled areas. The “security requirements” Eduardo Castillo mentioned in the podcast likely included coordination with SEBIN itself.

The infrastructure G-Network deployed doesn’t just serve commercial customers. It’s physically integrated into Venezuela’s most sensitive security perimeter.

Geographic convergence — G-Network fiber infrastructure within 400 meters of SEBIN headquarters

Hosting a SEBIN Officer’s Web Application

The discovery that G-Network hosts a login portal created by Detective Javier Ochoa — a SEBIN officer named on torture lists — transforms the relationship from proximity to operational integration.

This isn’t about a customer renting server space. This is a SEBIN operative using G-Network infrastructure to deploy operational systems.

What is the application… Who has access… What data does it process…

These questions cannot be answered from external scanning, but ODINT may have the answer in the near future with the amount of documents collected in our investigations of Venezuela.

The Censorship Apparatus

January 2025 — The Crackdown

In January 2025, as Venezuela faced renewed protests following the disputed presidential election, the Maduro regime deployed comprehensive internet censorship.

TikTok (January 2025)

• Duration: At least 10 consecutive nights
• Pattern: Blocks activated between 11:00 PM and 12:00 AM
• ISPs involved: CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter, Supercable, Vnet, Airtek, G-Network
• Method: DNS hijacking and IP blocking

Telegram (January 11, 2025)

• G-Network lifted the block at 6:30 AM, one of the last providers to restore access
• Block duration: several days
• Used to prevent coordination of protests

Tor Network (Documented)

• CANTV and G-Network attempted to restrict access to the Tor anonymity network
• Targeted Tor directory authorities
• Tor Browser with bridges remained partially operational

Public DNS Servers (40+)

• Google Public DNS: 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4
• Cloudflare DNS: 1.1.1.1, 1.0.0.1
• Quad9, OpenDNS, and others
• Purpose: force users to use ISP-controlled DNS, enabling content filtering and surveillance

VPN Services (21+)

• Commercial VPN providers throttled or blocked
• Protocols: OpenVPN, WireGuard, IPSec
• Purpose: eliminate circumvention tools

Documented censorship operations involving G-Network and other Venezuelan ISPs

CONATEL Orders

All blocks were implemented under directives from CONATEL, Venezuela’s telecommunications regulator, which operates under the Ministry of People’s Power for Science and Technology.

CONATEL does not publish block orders publicly. ISPs receive confidential administrative instructions, often transmitted via encrypted channels or in-person meetings, which they are legally required to implement within hours.

Carlos Longa’s August 2021 statement — that G-Network would make its platform available to assist the government “with security matters” — was not rhetorical. It was operational doctrine.

The Chinese Layer — CEIEC and CANTV

The Great Firewall of Venezuela

To understand G-Network’s role, one must understand the broader ecosystem in which it operates. At the top of that ecosystem is CANTV (Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela), the state-owned telecommunications monopoly that controls approximately 70% of Venezuela’s internet traffic.

In November 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a Chinese state-owned enterprise: CEIEC (China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation).

OFAC’s designation stated:

“CEIEC has provided Venezuela with technology, technical support, and services that help the Maduro regime restrict internet service and conduct digital surveillance and cyber operations against political opponents.”

According to the designation, CEIEC provided CANTV with software and hardware described as “a commercialized version of China’s Great Firewall” — the sophisticated censorship and surveillance infrastructure that underpins the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the internet in China.

This technology enables:

• Deep packet inspection (DPI) — analyzing the content of internet traffic in real-time
• Keyword filtering — blocking or flagging communications containing specific terms
• Traffic shaping — throttling or blocking specific protocols, apps, or websites
• Metadata collection — logging who communicates with whom, when, and via what platform

The recent ODINT “Crystal Vault” drop demonstrated how this infrastructure is working right now.

Chinese surveillance technology ecosystem deployed through CANTV

The Ecosystem Hierarchy

The Venezuelan internet censorship and surveillance architecture operates in layers:

1. CEIEC (China) — provides core technology and training to CANTV
2. CANTV (State) — implements nationwide filtering, surveillance, and data collection
3. CONATEL (Regulator) — issues block orders and coordinates enforcement
4. Private ISPs (including G-Network) — execute blocks at the edge, serving as last-mile enforcement nodes

G-Network, as an ASN with its own routing and peering, has the technical capability to implement independent filtering. But in Venezuela’s centralized telecommunications regime, “independent” means nothing. All ISPs operate under CONATEL’s authority.

G-Network’s participation in censorship is not optional. It’s a condition of its license.

But the company’s relationship with SEBIN suggests something beyond passive compliance.

The layered censorship and surveillance architecture — from China to the last mile

The Quadripartite Convergence

Four Actors, One Infrastructure

The investigation reveals a telecommunications infrastructure in La Guaira — centered on G-Network but extending to CANTV, Venefibra, and regional government — that serves as a node of convergence for four authoritarian actors:

1. China (CEIEC)

• Role: Surveillance technology provider to CANTV
• Technology: Great Firewall derivative for DPI, filtering, metadata collection
• Evidence: OFAC sanctions (November 2020), investigative reporting
• Connection to G-Network: Indirect — G-Network operates within the CANTV-dominated censorship architecture

2. Russia

• Role: Intelligence cooperation, technical consulting
• Personnel: Vadim Sidorov (VoGTU/VSTU consultant at G-Network)
• Agreements: November 2025 counterintelligence pact, October 2025 strategic treaty
• Technology: Italian/Russian monitoring systems used via CANTV
• Connection to G-Network: Direct — Russian national employed as consultant

3. Iran (MDC / Government of Iran)

• Role: Fiber optic manufacturing partnership
• Investment: $10 million USD in Venefibra
• Strategic goal: Establish presence in “the backyard of the United States” (Mirabadi)
• Infrastructure: Factory in Catia la Mar, 5 km from G-Network HQ
• Connection to G-Network: Indirect via Governor Terán, who is patron of both Venefibra and G-Network

4. SEBIN (Venezuelan Intelligence)

• Role: Detention, torture, surveillance, operational systems
• Infrastructure: Headquarters ~400m from G-Network fiber, hosts web application on G-Network IP
• Personnel link: Detective Javier Ochoa created domain hosted on 38.61.255.205
• Evidence: UN Fact-Finding Mission, IACHR Resolution 6/2015, civil society lists
• Connection to G-Network: Direct — SEBIN operatives use G-Network infrastructure

The quadripartite convergence — four authoritarian actors, one telecommunications infrastructure

The “Special Border Region” — Top Secret of SEBIN Found by ODINT

During the investigation of the SEBIN website, an important revelation was found: “Región Especial de Fronteras” (“Special Border Region”).

This term has never been officially defined by the Venezuelan regime in public, which reveals one of the SEBIN special units for the first time.

First public documentation of SEBIN’s “Región Especial de Fronteras” unit

The Unanswered Questions

This investigation has established a network of documented connections. But many questions remain:

About the Ministry Confrontation

• Which ministry told G-Network, “the roads of Caracas belong to them”…
• Was it CANTV, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, or SEBIN itself…
• What was negotiated to allow G-Network’s continued expansion…

About Iran and Russia

• Is there operational coordination between Venefibra, G-Network, and MDC…
• Do Iranian personnel have access to G-Network’s network operations center…
• Has Vadim Sidorov interacted with Iranian technical staff in La Guaira…
• Is the “data corridor” Iran is building through Oman intended to extend to Venezuela…

Implications for Latin America

Iran’s Strategic Foothold

Amirhossein Mirabadi’s statement about establishing a presence “in the backyard of the United States” was not hyperbole.

Venefibra is designed to export fiber optic cables to:

• Colombia
• Brazil
• Argentina
• Central America
• Caribbean nations

If these countries begin sourcing telecommunications infrastructure from an Iranian-Venezuelan joint venture, they inherit potential vulnerabilities: supply chain compromises, embedded backdoors, or dependencies that could be exploited for surveillance or disruption.

What is clear is that these revelations will attract the attention of various intelligence agencies such as Mossad, who have a significant interest in preventing Iranians from proliferating in the Americas.

Iran’s fiber optic export ambitions across Latin America via Venefibra