ODINT
← Back to Cyber Tours

Police and Security


TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. Executive Summary
  2. Cross-Domain Findings (Ranked by Severity)
  3. Domain: ministeriodelinterior.gob.ec
  4. Domain: policia.gob.ec
  5. Domain: bomberos.gob.ec
  6. Domain: atencionintegral.gob.ec (SNAI)
  7. Domain: ant.gob.ec
  8. Domain: ecu911.gob.ec
  9. Infrastructure Patterns
  10. Oraculo Vendor Pattern

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Scope: 6 domains covering police, interior ministry, fire service, prison service, transit agency, and emergency services Method: Passive web probing only (homepage, standard paths, REST API enumeration, header analysis, SSL inspection)

Of the six target domains, four were fully accessible and returned detailed reconnaissance data. Two domains had issues:

Domain Status CMS WAF Severity
ministeriodelinterior.gob.ec LIVE (unstable) WordPress 6.9.1 None detected MEDIUM
policia.gob.ec LIVE WordPress (Yoast 27.0) Sucuri/Cloudproxy HIGH (internal IP leak)
bomberos.gob.ec LIVE WordPress 6.9.1 None (nginx) CRITICAL (user enum + exposed services)
atencionintegral.gob.ec (SNAI) LIVE (unstable) WordPress None detected MEDIUM
ant.gob.ec DOWN (timeout) Unknown N/A N/A
ecu911.gob.ec LIVE WordPress 6.8.3 None (Apache) CRITICAL (user enum + XML-RPC + OWA + oraculo)

Key findings: 100% WordPress monoculture across all live sites. "oraculo" vendor account confirmed on ecu911.gob.ec. Two domains expose full user enumeration. ECU 911 has XML-RPC with system.multicall enabled (brute-force amplification vector). Exchange Server 2013 OWA exposed on ecu911 webmail. Internal IP leak in policia.gob.ec Feature-Policy header. Bomberos exposes internal Biotime/intranet IPs and Moodle on non-standard port.


CROSS-DOMAIN FINDINGS

CRITICAL

# Finding Domain(s) Detail
C-1 WP User Enumeration via REST API ecu911.gob.ec
C-4 Exchange Server 2013 OWA Exposed webmail.ecu911.gob.ec Outlook Web App login page at /owa/, Exchange build 15.0.1497 (2013-era, likely unpatched), domain\username auth format
C-5 Exposed Internal IPs and Services bomberos.gob.ec Public homepage links to internal services at 181.198.122.46:80 (Biotime attendance) and 181.198.122.46:8069 (Intranet/ERP, likely Odoo)

HIGH

# Finding Domain(s) Detail
H-1 Internal IP Leak in Feature-Policy Header policia.gob.ec HTTP header contains: Feature-Policy: microphone 'self' http://192.168.80.156/ -- leaks origin server IP behind Sucuri WAF
H-2 "oraculo" Vendor/Admin Account ecu911.gob.ec User ID 1 slug oraculo with display name "SIS ECU911" -- appears to be a shared vendor/contractor account (see Oraculo section)
H-3 wp-login.php Exposed Without Captcha ecu911.gob.ec, bomberos.gob.ec, ministeriodelinterior.gob.ec, atencionintegral.gob.ec Standard WordPress login pages with no CAPTCHA, no 2FA indicators, no rate limiting visible
H-4 Server Version Disclosure ecu911.gob.ec Headers expose: Apache/2.4.62 (AlmaLinux) OpenSSL/3.5.1 and PHP/8.4.17
H-5 Moodle LMS on Non-Standard Port moodlev5.bomberos.gob.ec:9090 Moodle 5 instance (YUI 3.18.1, jQuery 3.7.1) for firefighter training, 8-hour session timeout
H-6 Test/Debug Post Published Publicly policia.gob.ec Post ID 23032, title "sssss", published 2025-12-13, author ID 2 -- test content visible to public
H-7 xmlrpc.php Active (405 Method Not Allowed on GET) ecu911.gob.ec Responds 405 on GET but fully functional on POST -- confirms XML-RPC is processing requests

MEDIUM

# Finding Domain(s) Detail
M-1 Missing Security Headers bomberos.gob.ec, ecu911.gob.ec Missing: CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Permissions-Policy, X-XSS-Protection
M-2 Ninja Forms Submissions API Exposed bomberos.gob.ec
ecu911.gob.ec tecnologiaecu911
bomberos.gob.ec admin_9hkvwa61

DOMAIN NAME DISCREPANCIES

Requested Domain Actual Domain DNS Status
ministeriointerior.gob.ec ministeriodelinterior.gob.ec NXDOMAIN on requested
policiaecuador.gob.ec policia.gob.ec NXDOMAIN on requested
snai.gob.ec atencionintegral.gob.ec NXDOMAIN on requested
bomberos.gob.ec bomberos.gob.ec OK
ant.gob.ec ant.gob.ec Resolves but DOWN
ecu911.gob.ec ecu911.gob.ec OK