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Raw User Enumeration Dump | Ecuador

ODINT's Ecuador cyber tour maps exposed government infrastructure, tax APIs, shared CMS credentials, public GitLab code, and 26.25 GB of evidence.

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Editorial context image for Raw User Enumeration Dump | Ecuador
Context image / Diego Delso / CC BY-SA 4.0
ODINT Investigation Team2026-04-10
ODINT

Raw User Enumeration Dump

Ecuador Government — Raw User Enumeration Dump


Summary

Method: WordPress REST API

Summary: 28 Government Employee Accounts Exposed Across 8 Domains

Domain Sector Users Exposed "Oraculo" Present
ecu911.gob.ec Emergency Services 2 YES (ID 1)
arcotel.gob.ec Telecom Regulator 4 YES (ID 1)
aduana.gob.ec Customs 8 YES (ID 1)
seps.gob.ec Financial Regulator 3 NO
issfa.mil.ec Military Social Security 4 NO
comunicacion.gob.ec Gov Communications 3 NO
bomberos.gob.ec Fire Service 1 NO
iess.gob.ec Social Security BLOCKED (403) —

ECU 911 — Emergency Services (ecu911.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 oraculo SIS ECU911 f8d7367bd4a440196e31cdc8844d341e2a24da7529ebd11c97a2dbf3ecbb1b33 /author/oraculo/
2 tecnologiaecu911 Jorge Mondoza 42682e8a63890483a70571642c8a6fca85b5393014ea581f09866c1ec57ab18c /author/tecnologiaecu911/

Exchange Server: webmail.ecu911.gob.ec — Exchange 2013 (build 15.0.1497, EOL April 2023) WP-Statistics API: Exposed at /wp-statistics/v2 — hit tracking, online user monitoring


ARCOTEL — Telecom Regulator (arcotel.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 oraculo oraculo 751e90e92108044bd3daae8774753201 /author/oraculo/
6 comunicacion-arcotel Comunicación Arcotel 21fa1a324d3cfce0f5dba70b23a8ce4e /author/comunicacion-arcotel/
10 comunicacionredes ana torres 21fa1a324d3cfce0f5dba70b23a8ce4e /author/comunicacionredes/
13 decs-davidarrollo-2021 Sofy Zurita ab8e098142f00f85e182837be5c2c759 /author/decs-davidarrollo-2021/

Internal IP leaked: 172.20.1.172 Zero security headers Note: comunicacion-arcotel and comunicacionredes share same gravatar hash — same email address


ADUANA — Customs (aduana.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 oraculo oraculo (gravatar) /author/oraculo/
2 cargonza Carlos Gonzalez (gravatar) /author/cargonza/
3 jcortez Jackson Cortez (gravatar) /author/jcortez/
4 dizamora Didimo Zamora (gravatar) /author/dizamora/
5 gicordo Giovanny Cordova (gravatar) /author/gicordo/
6 garellano Galo Arellano (gravatar) /author/garellano/
8 mquiroga Miguel Quiroga (gravatar) /author/mquiroga/
23 rasanchez Ronald Sanchez (gravatar) /author/rasanchez/

8 customs employees with full names exposed — username pattern is first-initial + last-name abbreviation (easy to predict for other employees)


SEPS — Financial Regulator (seps.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 admins3ps2021 Alejandro 189aa690dab1958e913f0e0c76c09922b44e61fe7d142477b28a659d44b7ffde /author/admins3ps2021/
3 inhuman_ec Roque Proaño d3ee08689c090114dd5ac0b752215e61caa20a6ebe350b20a7f1642712205c46 /author/inhuman_ec/
5 simbiontec Alejandro Lozano 5728838db31fa878d23fcf7be73301499e52e1d0bff435819ffeaf1b2dc594fe /author/simbiontec/

admins3ps2021 — year in admin username suggests predictable credential pattern simbiontec — Ecuadorian web development agency (external contractor on financial regulator) inhuman_ec — likely another contractor


ISSFA — Military Social Security (issfa.mil.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 webmasterft webmasterft c3a3aae51d79865f4d40b7189d73ab4d /author/webmasterft/
2 gestion Gestion Publicidad 5def94b89fb282ad3cc21cf02c8531f9 /author/gestion/
5 issfa-editor-1-anita Anita Villarruel a7c6d682fd3fca924ba1720a42fed14a /author/issfa-editor-1-anita/
6 issfa-editor-2-sebastian Sebastian Cardenas b1b1256a936e2a8328c9b80eb83faed3 /author/issfa-editor-2-sebastian/

WordPress 6.2.2 (2+ years outdated) eDoc system uses RSA 1024-bit (weak) Military personnel names exposed — Anita Villarruel, Sebastian Cardenas


COMUNICACION — Government Communications (comunicacion.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 administrador administrador 9828b784c83bec77a42383037d2e8fbf761b4695ed17f22ac98dff0145a64d62 /author/administrador/
20 simon-feijoo Dirección de Comunicación Digital de Gobierno y Cobertura 5c0072d96d157bb4cc8ddd23cc0d11be4cef2de6a9c859f06a8a1cdf61be35c2 /author/simon-feijoo/
24 comunicacion-digital Comunicacion Digital 4604fb84ea7d33c25ecd7c3796dd097a077e363e8f39a116523f1579a0e3feeb /author/comunicacion-digital/

simon-feijoo — real person name exposed as slug, display name reveals government department title


BOMBEROS — Fire Service (bomberos.gob.ec)

ID Username/Slug Display Name Gravatar Hash Author URL
1 admin_9hkvwa61 Juan Coronel 2ca2d61359be9e9fd59f44a68750cad87a5e40cb36bac09e09485a9a86cf38f6 /author/admin_9hkvwa61/

Internal services exposed on homepage:181.198.122.46:80 (Biotime attendance), 181.198.122.46:8069 (ERP/Odoo)


"Oraculo" Vendor Tracking

The oraculo account appears as User ID 1 (WordPress superadmin — the first account created during installation) on:

Site Display Name Gravatar Hash
ecu911.gob.ec SIS ECU911 f8d7367b...
arcotel.gob.ec oraculo 751e90e9...
aduana.gob.ec oraculo (different)

Different gravatar hashes = different email addresses used per site, but same oraculo slug = same vendor/deployment tool.

The oraculo WordPress plugin source code is publicly available on the Ecuador government GitLab (minka.gob.ec) and contains:

  • Hardcoded password:SNAPsitio30v
  • Hardcoded salt:ALRTOPER984TNMGDGFDH
  • SQL injection vectors in ajax_selects.php and procesarContacto.php
  • Deprecated MCrypt encryption (SHA256-based)
  • No CSRF protection on form handlers
  • No input sanitization on database queries

This single vendor/plugin represents a systemic supply chain vulnerability across Ecuador's entire government web infrastructure.

END OF RECORD

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